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HAMMERSMITH MEETS ORANGE COUNTY:
"WISHING UPON A STAR!" WITH TAXPAYER
MONEY IN THE MUNICIPAL BOND
DERIVATIVE MARKET
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the founding of the colonies, England has continually
provided the United States with institutions and ideas-the basis of a
legal system, the concept of insurance, theories of governance, and fish-
and-chips, to name a few. Unfortunately, municipal governments in the
United States have borrowed another facet of English life that they would
have done well to leave unexplored-speculation in the derivative
market.2
Derivatives are complex financial instruments used by businesses,
financial institutions, mutual and pension funds, and government
I. LEIGH HARLrNE, When You Wish Upon a Star (Irving Berlin 1940). This song is
featured in the full length motion picture "Pinocchio" by Walt Disney. The Walt Disney
amusement park "Disneyland" is located in Orange County, California (Orange County or
the County). See Protect the Public From Speculation in Derivatives, USA TODAY, Dec.
7, 1994, at 10A.
2. See infra note 30 for the definition of a derivative and part II for a detailed
explanation of how a derivative works. For purposes of this Note, the terms "derivative,"
"derivative transaction," and "derivative agreement' will be used interchangeably.
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entities3 to hedge4 against interest rate fluctuation.' The use of
derivatives, which began in ancient civilizations, has exploded in recent
years.6 When used cautiously and sparingly by sophisticated investors,
derivatives can protect investments against dramatic fluctuations in
interest rates and secure future cash flow to the entity entering into the
derivative agreement.7 Although institutions well-trained in their
complexities have used derivatives effectively,' municipal governments
3. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS,
PUB. No. B-257099, FINANCIAL DERIvATIVES: ACTIONS NEEDED TO PROTECT THE
FINANCIAL SYSTEM 24, 29 (1994) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. This Note will focus on
the use of derivatives by municipal governments.
4. Id. at 26. An act of hedging is: "Safeguarding one's self from loss on a bet or
speculation by making compensatory arrangements on the other side." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 722 (6th ed. 1990).
5. See infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text. See also text accompanying notes
20-22 (describing Orange County's failed attempt to predict interest rate movement).
6. Derivatives of some form were used in financial matters by ancient civilizations.
JERRY W. MARKHAM, THE HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING AND ITS
REGULATION 3 (1987) (tracing futures transactions by merchants as far back as 2000 B.C.).
The recent popularity of derivatives as a financial hedging device began in the early 1980s.
See Martin Loughlin, Innovative Financing in Local Government: The Limits of Legal
Instrumentalism - Part I, 1990 PUB. LAW 372, 388 (Autumn 1990) [hereinafter Loughlin,
Part 1] (discussing growth of the swaps market). For the fiscal year 1992, the
notional/contract amount of derivatives outstanding worldwide was estimated to be $12.1
trillion. This represents a 145% increase from the end of fiscal year 1989 (the first year
comparable data is available). GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 34-35. Municipal investors
in the derivative market have primarily entered into the type of derivative agreements
known as interest rate swaps (swaps). See id. at 132, figure 1.2. For the definition of a
notional/contract amount, see infra note 38.
7. See infra note 43.
8. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey was able to lock in savings of
$640,000 by entering into two swaps that effectively lowered its borrowing rate from
6.50% to 5.32%. See John Haupert, Using Interest Rate Swaps as Part of an Overall
Financing and Investment Strategy, GOV'T FIN. REV., Oct. 1992, at 13, 14. See also
Bruce D. Bohlen, Utilization of an Improved Forward Delivery Bond to Enhance Interest
Rate Management, GOV'T FIN. REv., Feb. 1994, at 13.
In 1988, the City of Columbia, Missouri estimated that it would save $3,365,000 in
interest payments over the following 10 years as the result of a favorable interest rate
swap. Rising interest rates, however, could temper this optimistic prediction. Harold
Boldt, Reducing Interest Costs with an Interest Rate Swap in Columbia, Missouri, GOV'T
FIN. REV., June 1988, at 23, 24.
In Scotland in 1989, the Glasgow District Council estimated that it had already saved
£3.8 million ($6.4 million) through 11 swap transactions and further estimated that these
deals would save the authority an additional £3.4 million ($5.7 million) per year.
Loughlin, Part 1, supra note 6, at 394-95.
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have recently incurred extraordinary losses because their financial
investors failed to properly predict interest rate fluctuations. 9
In February 1989, the Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough
Council (Hammersmith or the Council)'0 defaulted on payments it owed
various banks under its swap agreements." This default, the world's
largest in the derivative market at that time, totaled over £200 million
($337.4 million).' 2 In Hazell v. Hammersmith & Fulham London
Borough Council,13 the House of Lords held that the Council never had
the authority to enter into the swap transactions and that the swaps were,
thus, ultra vires.'4 The House of Lords terminated all swap agreements
between local governments and banks and left in doubt whether all
previously paid money from the agreements had to be returned. 5
Derivative failure of this magnitude eluded the United States
financial market until December 1994 when shock waves reverberated
throughout the nation as Orange County, California (Orange County or
the County) declared bankruptcy.' 6  The bankruptcy, the largest in
9. See infra part Ill for a detailed discussion of derivative losses suffered by the
Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council and part IV for a detailed discussion
of derivative losses suffered by Orange County.
10. See infra text accompanying note 49.
11. See infra note 34 (defining swap agreements) and part III.A (discussing the swap
default by Hammersmith).
12. Martin Loughlin, Innovative Financing in Local Government: The Limits of Legal
Instrumentalism - Part I1, 1991 PuB. LAW 568, 574 (Winter 1991) [hereinafter Loughlin,
Part ll].
March 31, 1989 is the date used by the English courts to determine the total value of
outstanding swaps for purposes of the Hammersmith lawsuits. The exchange rate used
throughout this Note is based on the March 31, 1989 exchange rate of 1.6870 United
States dollars per pound sterling. WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 1989, at C13 (Exchange Rates
table).
13. Hazellv. Hammersmith & Fulham London Borough Council, [1991] 2 W.L.R. 372
(Eng. H.L.) [hereinafter Hammersmith III].
14. Id. at 373. An ultra vires act is one "performed without any authority to act on
subject.... Ultra vires act of municipality is one which is beyond powers conferred upon
it by law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1522 (6th ed. 1990).
15. Hammersmith III, [1991] 2 W.L.R. at 389-90. Under the swap agreements, the
Council had both received and made payments to its counterparties, the banks. The status
of those payments was in doubt. Id. See also infra notes 76-90 and accompanying text.
16. Mark Platte et al., Orange County Files for Bankruptcy Protection as Creditor
Seeks Payment, L.A. TImES, Dec. 7, 1994, at Al.
1996]
Washington University Open Scholarship
318 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 49:315
United States municipal government history,"7 was the result of
improper use of taxpayer funds in the derivative market. 8 The
treasurer of Orange County, Robert Citron, lost $1.7 billion of a $7.5
billion investment pool 9 by entering into an unusually large number of
derivative agreements. The majority of these agreements were reverse
repurchase agreements (reverse repos)2 Citron made the mistake of
speculating that interest rates would either stay the same or decrease.2'
When interest rates rose, the reverse repos obligated Orange County to
pay large sums of interest, a loss that the County would not have
incurred under a conservative fiscal policy.' Numerous lawsuits have
been filed to determine who will incur liability for the loss,' a question
17. Id.
18. See infra notes 98-101.
19. Ted Bunker, Congressional Panel Weighs Charges to Municipal BankruptcyLaws,
INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, July 27, 1995, at A3. An investment pool is a group of
government entities "who organize for the purpose of exploiting a certain stock or stocks;
... [or] a joint venture of [a] temporary association of speculators." CHARLES J.
WOELFEL, THE DICTIONARY OF BANKING 181 (1994).
Over 180 pool participants invested in the Orange County derivative fund. Andy
Pasztor, Orange County's Chief Executive Quits in Wake of Clashes with Elected Board,
WALL. ST. J., July 13, 1995, at Al. These school districts, cities, counties, special
districts, and other government agencies used their investments to earn money needed for
new construction, daily operations, and loan payments. For an agency-by-agency
breakdown of how much money each government entity and each mutual fund invested
in the pool, see Orange County in Bankruptcy: Mutual Funds' Stake, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 8,
1994, at A26 (itemizing the holdings of mutual funds in Orange County debt); Platte,
supra note 16, at Al (detailing the amount invested in the pool by each government
agency).
20. Reynolds Holding, Suits Sure to Follow Bankruptcy: Assessing Blame in Orange
County, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 10, 1994, at Al. Reverse repurchase agreements (reverse
repos) are "transaction[s] involving the sale of securities along with an agreement to
repurchase the securities at an agreed upon price, date, and interest payment." WOELFEL,
supra note 19, at 201. See generally Stephen A. Lumpkin, Repurchase and Reverse
Repurchase Agreements, in INSTRUMENTS OF THE MONEY MARKET 65 (Timothy Q. Cook
& Timothy D. Rowe eds., 6th ed. 1986).
21. See infra note 100. It is estimated that the fund lost $1.7 billion. Pasztor, supra
note 19, at Al.
22. See infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text (discussing the risky derivative
transactions entered into by Orange County).
23. See, e.g., First Lawsuit by an Orange County Pool Participant Filed in Federal
Court Against Merrill Lynch, Citron and Stamenson over Orange County Debacle, Bus.
WIRE, Jan. 10, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File [hereinafter First
Lawsuit Filed] (detailing a class action suit filed by the Schools Excess Liability Fund
alleging that the defendants carelessly invested public money); Holding, supra note 20 at
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of first impression in the United States.24 It remains to be seen whether
the American courts will follow the holding in the British case of
Hammersmith and declare the derivatives agreements ultra vires.'
With the increase in derivative deals that adversely affect
municipalities, and the attendant losses of taxpayer money, cries for
regulation of the municipal derivatives market grow louder.26 This Note
examines the events that led to the Orange County debacle and proposes
a strict rule that would greatly decrease the possibility that municipal
governments could squander taxpayer money away in that fashion again.
Part II briefly discusses the intricacies of a derivative agreement. Part
III examines the Hammersmith decision and the potential consequences
if United States courts adopt a similar doctrine. Part IV analyzes the
evolving Orange County disaster and contemplates who could incur
liability as a result of the failed derivative agreements. Part V addresses
current municipal authority to enter into derivative agreements based on
state statutes. Part V also reviews congressional initiatives to curtail this
authority. Finally, Part VI proposes a stringent federal statute that
attempts to eliminate the risk that a municipal government will gamble
in the derivative market with taxpayer money while retaining its ability
to enter derivative transactions to protect against the risks associated with
fluctuating interest rates.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DERIVATIVE/SWAP MARKET
With the abandonment of the Bretton Woods system of fixed
currency rates in the early 1970s27 and the volatility of interest rates in
A8 ("[T]here will no doubt be more than just a spate of lawsuits. They will probably
come against those in the private sector who allowed this to happen.... .") (quoting
Orange County attorney Ronald Rus); Susan M. Owen & Jodi Wilgoren, Orange County
in Bankruptcy: 9 Class-Action Suits Against Wall Street Firm, Others Joined, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 10, 1995, at A8 (discussing the consolidation of class action lawsuits brought against
Merrill Lynch).
24. Holding, supra note 20, at A8.
25. Id. See infra notes 76-84 and accompanying text (discussing the House of Lords'
decision in Hammersmith).
26. See infra notes 142-56 (outlining the various reform movements). See also Henry
T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes oflnformational Failure and the Promise
of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1460 n.12 (1993).
27. "The Bretton Woods system, established in 1944, maintained exchange rate
stability by fixing non-U.S. currencies to the U.S. dollar, which was convertible into gold
at $35 per ounce. The United States suspended convertability into gold in 1971, and the
1996]
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the early 1980s, 28 investors clamored for a new financial device that
would protect them from risks due to unpredictable fluctuations in the
currency and interest rate markets. 29  Responding to this demand,
financial institutions turned to a product designed to control some of the
risk-the derivative.3" As the use of derivatives has exploded in recent
years, the reasons for using them have expanded beyond their original
protective function.1 Investors use derivatives for four main purposes:
(1) to hedge against adverse changes in the value of assets or liabilities;
(2) to restructure financing terms more favorably; (3) to change the asset
mix of portfolios; and (4) to speculate on the direction interest rates will
move in the hope of gaining pure profit.32
In order to appreciate the risks inherent in derivative agreements, it
is important to understand the basic elements of these transactions.33
system of fixed currency rates was abandoned in 1973." GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at
24 n.l.
28. Prior to 1979, the Federal Reserve (FED) considered it imperative to control
interest rates. In October 1979, government policy changed to a greater open market as
the FED allowed interest rates to oscillate more freely. See GAO REPORT, supra note 3,
at 24. With this change, interest rates in the early 1980s became much more
unpredictable. See Hu, supra note 26, at 1466.
29. Emete Hassan & Bill Chew, Municipal Derivatives in the Primary Market,
CREDITWEEK MUNICIPAL, June 14, 1993, at 1.
30. Derivatives are "[flinancial instruments that derive their value from the
performance of assets, interest, currency exchange rates, or indexes; a security whose value
depends in some way upon the values of other more basic underlying securities, e.g.,
fitures on the long Treasury bond and the call option on a stock." WOELFEL, supra note
19, at 78. See generally, Hu, supra note 26, at 1464-67 (defining the derivative and its
uses).
31. See Loughlin, Part 1, supra note 6, at 389-90 (stating that swaps can be used to
avoid limits on borrowing power and to generate income). See also GAO REPORT, supra
note 3, at 25-26 (noting that derivatives can be used to speculate for profit and to obtain
more desirable financing terms).
32. GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 25-26. See also Philip N. Shapiro & T. Spencer
Wright, An Issuer's Perspective on Interest Rate Swaps, GOV'T FIN. REV., Oct. 1992, at
7 (noting additional uses of the derivative known as "interest rate swaps").
33. The Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) offered the following
explanation of the use of derivative products:
Participants in the derivatives markets are dealers and end users. End users
include financial institutions, businesses, mutual and pension funds, and
government entities. Dealers are usually large commercial banks or securities
firms and insurance companies and their affiliates. Derivatives can be traded
through established exchanges. Derivatives can also be traded through contracts
negotiated privately between two parties, called over-the-counter (OTC)
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol49/iss1/12
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Municipal governments entering the derivative market most commonly
engage in interest rate swaps (swaps).34 In fact, the £200 million
($337.4 million) loss in Hammersmith was solely the result of incorrect
speculation in interest rate swaps.35 Thus, this section will focus on the
mechanics of a municipal government swap.
The typical municipal government swap agreement involves a
contract between the municipality and a swap company36 to exchange
specified interest payments tied to some predesignated index37 or
underlying principal.3 The simplest swaps are the fixed-to-floating rate
derivatives. While payments between counterparties of exchange-traded
derivatives are guaranteed, those between counterparties of OTC derivatives are
not.
Government Finance Association Policy Statement on Regulation of Derivative Products,
GOV'r FIN. REV., Aug. 1994, at 16 [hereinafter Gov't Fin. Ass'n Policy]. See generally
KPMG, SOLVING THE MYSTERY OF DERIVATIVES (Matthew Bender 1994) [hereinafter
SOLVING THE MYSTERY] (describing several types of derivatives and their uses).
34. Unless otherwise noted, this Note will use the terms "swap," "swap transaction,"
and "swap agreement" interchangeably. A swap is "[a] financial transaction in which two
counterparties agree to exchange streams of payments over time according to a
predetermined rule, normally used to transform the market exposure associated with a loan
or bond borrowing from one interest rate base or currency of denomination to another."
WOELFEL, supra note 19, at 225. Swaps are further defined as "the exchange of one asset
or liability for a similar asset or liability for the purpose of lengthening or shortening
maturities, or raising or lowering coupon rates to maximize revenue or minimize financing
costs." Id. See also Hu, supra note 26, at 1476 (describing swap agreements); SOLVING
THE MYSTERY, supra note 33, at 4-7 (discussing swaps).
Of all local government entities using derivative products in fiscal year 1992,
approximately 50% reported using interest rate swaps. Use of other types of
derivatives-futures, foreign exchange, options and forwards-ranged between 10 and
15%. GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 132 Figure 1.2. In an interest rate swap, two parties,
typically through an intermediary, agree to exchange their payment obligations on their
debts. Shapiro & Wright, supra note 32, at 7. It is important to note that the parties do
not exchange principal; nor do they alter underlying debt obligations. Id. at 7-8.
35. See Loughlin, Part I, supra note 6, at 394. See infra part III.A (detailing
Hammersmith's involvement in the swap market).
36. The swap company is often a middle man who arranges the swap independently
with both parties. The company can attempt to perfectly match the swap so that it has
absolutely no exposure to interest rate risk. When the swap company matches two parties
desiring opposite terms, the company receives a commission from both parties, without
incurring risk. See SOLVING THE MYSTERY, supra note 33, at 38-39. In addition to acting
as intermediaries, dealers may enter the derivatives market as counterparties. Id.
37. See infra note 42 (identifying the different indices).
38. The underlying principal of a derivative transaction is called the "notional" or
"contract" amount. This amount represents the total outstanding debt to which the interest
1996]
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swaps 39 and the floating-to-fixed rate swaps.4' This section examines
the fixed-to-floating rate swap.
In a fixed-to-floating rate swap, the municipal government receives
a fixed rate of interest from the swap company4' and, in return, pays the
swap company a floating rate of interest based upon some previously
designated index for a specified period of time.42  This device, when
used successfully, results in a restructuring of cash-flow for the
municipality and can provide a hedge against interest rate risk.43
Problems arise, however, when a fast-talking, high-profile swap company
attempts to push a swap agreement on an unsophisticated municipality
rates are applied in order to calculate the payment obligations. Although this figure far
exceeds the actual credit exposure from the derivative, estimates of swap volumes are
generally given in this amount. John A.M. Price & Schuyler K. Henderson, CURRENCY
AND INTEREST RATE SWAPS 203 (2d ed. 1988).
39. In a fixed-to-floating rate swap, the municipality makes floating-rate interest
payments to the swap company in exchange for a fixed interest payment to the
municipality based on a fixed notional amount for a specified time period. Shapiro &
Wright, supra note 32, at 8. The municipality uses the fixed-rate payment it receives from
the swap company to pay its fixed-rate obligations. In effect, the municipality trades its
fixed-rate liability, based on its underlying debt obligations, for a floating-rate liability to
the swap company. Id.
40. The floating-to-fixed rate swap is identical to the fixed-to-floating rate swap-it
is merely the same transaction from the viewpoint of the other party. For a graph of this
transaction, see id. at 8.
41. The municipality often seeks a fixed payment that is equal to the amount that it
is paying on a previous bond issue, using the same notional amount and the same rate.
See, e.g., id. at 8-9. For example, if the municipal government funds a project with a 10-
year, 7% bond and subsequently desires to change this to a floating rate, the municipality
will receive 7% on the notional amount from the swap company.
42. This type of swap transaction is generally referred to as a "Plain-vanilla" interest
rate swap. SOLVING THE MYSTERY, supra note 33, at 100 (defining the Plain-vanilla
swap).
The parties regularly reset the floating or variable rate to coincide with one of three
main indices: the JJ Kenny Index, the Public Securities Association Municipal Swap Index
(PSA), or the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR). Shapiro & Wright, supra note
32, at 8. See also GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 28.
43. GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 28-29. See also Shapiro & Wright, supra note 32,
at 8-9 (discussing benefits of fixed-to-floating rate swaps).
See generally, Dan Fischer, Note, WPPSS and Hammersmith: Increased Credit Risk
Protection Resultingfrom Unprecedented Defaults, 9 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 513, 520-
24 (1992) (providing detailed analysis of the various swaps and how they can be used (1)
to lower borrowing costs; (2) as a gap management tool; and (3) to manage basis risk).
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treasurer or financial advisor.' Not understanding the steps necessary
to hedge against fluctuations in the interest rate, the treasurer or advisor
may be blinded by the promise of initial cash savings and not realize the
great risk of potential losses."'
The losses occur when interest rates suddenly or unexpectedly
rise.' While the municipality still receives from the swap company the
fixed rate from the agreement, the rise in interest rates drives the floating
rate it must pay above the fixed rate it receives. This forces the
municipality to pay in excess of the bond's coupon rate-the original
debt obligation it was seeking to reduce through the swap agreement.47
44. See, e.g., Jeff Brown, Exotic Gamblers; Orange County's Woes Prompt Rush to
Regulate Municipal Investments, PrrT. POST-GAzETE, Dec. 9, 1994, at C8 ("'The problem
with municipalities getting into these things is that almost invariably, the guy on the other
side of the contract is a lot smarter than they are, because that's his business.") (quoting
Richard Lehmann, president of the Bond Investors Association); Shapiro & Wright, supra
note 32, at 10 ("Swaps are complicated instruments, the risks of which need to be
explained fully and completely to [government officials]. Most [officials] are not active
in these markets and the concepts are fairly elusive to most people.").
45. See infra part IV (discussing the derivative-caused bankruptcy of Orange County).
See also Janin Friend, Portfolios of Eight Texas Colleges Laden With Risky Derivatives,
Report Finds, BOND BUYER, Dec. 22, 1994, at I (reporting that eight Texas universities
and junior colleges face future financial difficulty because of poor derivative investment);
Aaron Pressman, When Swaps Go Bad: Philadelphia's Deal Provides a Lesson in Basis
Risk for Issuers, BOND BUYER, Dec. 6, 1993, at I (describing the unexpected occurrences
that turned a Philadelphia swap agreement into a loser).
For example, in Philadelphia, city officials and its financial advisor agreed to pay a
fixed rate to Merrill Lynch in exchange for a variable rate that the city anticipated would
match the amount it owed its bondholders. However, several unanticipated events, such
as a drop in the city's bond rating, forced the amount Philadelphia owed to its bondholders
over the amount it took in from Merrill Lynch. Pressman, supra, at 2. This is an example
of "basis" risk. Shapiro & Wright, supra note 32, at 9. "Interest rate" risk is due to the
potential for rising interest rates in the underlying index to which the floating rate is tied,
thus driving up the municipality's obligation to the swap company. Id.
The author of this Note observed a sales pitch by a swap company to a municipality.
The swap company produced elaborate graphs explaining how much money the
municipality could save immediately by swapping its fixed rate for a lower rate based on
the PSA Municipal Swap Index. The graphs showed that the municipality would still
make money with a small increase in the PSA. Just hours before finalizing an
unprotected, fixed-to-floating swap, municipality officials asked the all-important question:
"What if interest rates go up more than the amounts on your projections?" Not satisfied
with the answer, the municipality chose not to enter into the speculative derivative
transaction.
46. See supra text accompanying notes 19-22.
47. Of course, if short-term market interest rates decline, the value to the floating-rate
payer increases with each basis point drop in the interest rate. See Shapiro & Wright
1996]
Washington University Open Scholarship
324 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 49:315
If the floating rate continues to rise, the municipality will experience
large losses and be forced to explain why it is paying out large sums of
money at a higher percentage rate than called for in the original bond
issue. Recently, this unfortunate scenario has occurred with greater
frequency, 48 leaving the courts with two important questions: (1) Who
is to blame when a municipal government loses large sums of money in
the derivative market?; and (2) Can this trend be curtailed? As will be
seen below, the English courts, investors, financial analysts and
politicians all have different answers to these questions.
III. HAMMERSMITH AND ITS CONSEQUENCES IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The History of Hammersmith
Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council is a Royally
Chartered borough subject to the Local Government Act of 1972. 49 The
Council engaged in a small number of interest rate swaps between
December 1983 and March 1987.50 Between April 1987 and July 1988,
however, the Council entered into an unusually large number of
speculative transactions in the hope of making a profit to supplement the
Borough's revenue." Having already been granted authorization to
supra note 32, at 8-9.
48. See, e.g., Friend, supra note 45 (discussing losses at eight Texas colleges and
universities); Pressman, supra note 45 (discussing Philadelphia's losses).
49. See Hammersmith 11I, [1991] 2 W.L.R. 372, 376 (Eng. H.L.). Section 111 of the
Local Government Act codifies the common law principle that local authorities have
implied power to take any action necessary to discharge their functions. Anthony Hill,
Legal Capacities of Statutory Bodies in Relation to Financial Dealings-The Hammersmith
Decision, 2 BOND L.R. 90, 92 (1990). See infra part II.B for a discussion of the lower
courts' interpretations of § 111 as it relates to the derivatives agreements Hammersmith
entered. The relevant portion of § 111 states, "(1) [A] local authority shall have power
to do any thing (whether or not involving the expenditure, borrowing or lending of money
or the acquisition or disposal of any property or rights) which is calculated to facilitate,
or is conducive or incidental to, the discharge of any of their functions." Local
Government Act, 1972, ch. 70, § 111(1) (Eng.) (emphasis added).
50. Hill, supra note 49, at 91.
51. During this time period, the Council entered into 592 derivative transactions with
a total notional amount ofE6.1 billion ($10.3 billion). Loughlin, Part I, supra note 6, at
392. This figure is approximately 15 times the total outstanding debt that Hammersmith
incurred to undertake capital projects over many years. Fischer, supra note 43, at 526.
The following figure illustrates the speculative nature of the transactions the Council
entered-over 63% of the interest rate swaps that were still outstanding on March 31, 1989
were unprotected fixed-to-floating rate swaps, thus exposing the Council to great risk from
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conduct the Council's borrowing, the director of finance received further
power when he was explicitly granted authority to arrange transactions
in the London Money and Capital Market. 2 He was given this
prerogative by the Council to allow him to take advantage of predicted
favorable movements in interest rates.53 The Council would benefit
from these transactions if interest rates fell and would lose if interest
rates rose.m
As interest rates began to rise and the Council began to lose large
sums of money, the Audit Commission of Local Authorities in England
and Wales appointed an auditor to check the accounts of
Hammersmith.5 5  Upon the auditor's determination that the swap
transactions could be illegal, Hammersmith's director of finance closed
all of the swap accounts that were then losing money. 6 Between
August 1988 and February 1989, Hammersmith engaged in only those
swap transactions designed to reduce the Council's exposure to loss from
increasing interest rates-this became known as the "interim strategy."57
Finally, on February 22, 1989, counsel for Hammersmith advised that the
magnitude of the Council's speculation was beyond reasonable
fluctuations in interest rates. Hazell v. Hammersmith & Fulham London Borough Council,
[1990] 2 W.L.R. 17 app. at 53-54 (Eng. Q.B. Div'l Ct.) [hereinafter Hammersmith 1].
To understand why Hammersmith entered these transactions, see Gregory J. Millman,
Derivatives as Dump Trucks, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 1994, at C2 ("When Margaret
Thatcher cut government budgets in England, the managers of this township decided to
make up what they had lost by speculating in the financial markets-ultimately making
the township the biggest single player in the British sterling swap markets.").
52. Hammersmith I, [1991] 2 W.L.R. at 372.
53. Id. For a thorough discussion of the interrelationship between the central
government and local authorities and its impact on local finances, see Loughlin, Part I,
supra note 6, at 374-76.
54. Hammersmith X1, [1991] 2 W.L.R at 372. See also supra notes 34-42 and
accompanying text (explaining the intricacies of a swap transaction).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 372-73. See also Loughlin, Part I, supra note 6, at 392-93. The interim
strategy was designed to reduce exposure to losses for outstanding swaps by entering into
additional swaps that hedged against the outstanding swaps that were losing money. This
could be viewed as "interest risk management" and not "trading." See Hazell v.
Hammersmith & Fulham London Council, [1990] 2 W.L.R. 1038, 1040 (Eng. C.A.)
[hereinafter Hammersmith Il].
1996]
Washington University Open Scholarship
326 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 49:315
parameters and, therefore, unlawful.58 Thereafter, the Council ceased
participation in further swap transactions."
On March 31, 1989, the Council had 297 outstanding swap
agreements involving an aggregate notional amount of £2.996 billion
($5.054 billion).60 This sum represented approximately fifteen times the
amount of actual borrowing the Council had outstanding on the same
date.6' Estimates of the cost to Hammersmith if it were required to pay
losses on the swap transactions ranged from a low of £13 million ($21.9
million), if restitution were allowed,62 to losses in excess of £406.3
million ($685.4 million) if interest rates rose by as little as one
percent. 63 As a result of the projected losses, the auditor filed a suit
pursuant to section 19 of the Local Government Finance Act of 1982,
leaving it up to the courts to determine the validity of the swap
transactions. 64
58. Hammersmith I, (1991] 2 W.L.R. at 373. Earlier that day, the auditor advised
the director of finance not to engage in any further activity unless his actions could be
supported by legal opinion. Id.
59. Loughlin, Part I, supra note 6, at 393.
60. Hammersmith I, [1990] 2 W.L.R. app. at 53 (depicting the kinds of derivatives the
Council entered into and the amounts invested).
61. See supra note 51. See also Fischer, supra note 43, at 526 n.69 (arguing that the
amount borrowed was excessive because "the Council only needed to enter into swap
contracts equal to, at most, the amount of their borrowing (£390 million) in order to
protect themselves against adverse interest rate movements").
62. See Loughlin, Part II, supra note 12, at 574 ("[F]ull restitution of payments by
Hammersmith exposed the authority to a maximum loss of around £13 million.'), Here,
Loughlin is referring to the possibility that, if the Council had no authority to enter the
agreements, all payments made pursuant to the swaps might be restored to the payers.
Loughlin, Part 1, supra note 6, at 395.
63. Hammersmith II, [1991] 2 W.L.R. at 381. "'If interest rates rise by one per cent.
the council will lose £406.3 m[illion]."' Id. (quoting from the sworn affidavit of the
auditor on May 30, 1989). The exact amount of the maximum loss depended upon both
the rise in interest rates and which underlying index was used to calculate the payments
under the swaps. Id.
64. Hammersmith I, [1990] 2 W.L.R. app. at 17-18. Section 19 provides the
following: "(1) Where it appears to the auditor carrying out the audit of any accounts...
that any item of account is contrary to law he may apply to the court for a declaration that
the item is contrary to law except where it is sanctioned by the Secretary of State." Local
Government Finance Act, 1982, ch. 32, § 19(1) (Eng.). Hammersmith sought approval
from the Secretary of State to make and receive payments under the swaps. This approval
was denied on Feb. 28, 1989, prompting Hammersmith's suspension of its swap
involvements. Loughlin, Part I, supra note 6, at 393.
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B. The Lower Courts' Disagreement
On application of the auditor to the Divisional Court, the court held
that there was no express statutory power for a local authority to enter
into swap transactions.' Thus, the court determined that all 592
transactions the Council entered into between 1987 and 1989 were ultra
vires." The court examined section 111 of the Local Government Act
of 197267 and asserted that swap transactions were not incidental to the
borrowing and investing powers of the government. 6' Therefore, the
swaps did not have the required nexus to qualify as within the power
granted to the local authority. 9
Less than four months later, the Court of Appeal reversed the
Divisional Court's decision, holding that the critical factor in determining
a swap's validity was the purpose for which a local authority entered into
the swap transaction.7" If the Council had entered into the swap
agreements to hedge against fluctuations in interest rates, the swaps
would be held legal and enforceable.7 ' If, however, the Council had
The auditor brought suit against the Council seeking a declaration that the transactions
in the capital market fund between 1987 and 1989 were not legal and ordering rectification
of the accounts. Because there was no incentive for the Council to win the case (indeed,
the Council wanted to lose the case so that its swaps would be found illegal and it could
possibly escape payment on their agreements), the court granted leave to five banks,
"selected because they have... been involved in a cross-section of the transactions," to
enter the litigation as plaintiffs in order to protect their commercial interests.
Hammersmith 1, [1990] 2 W.L.R. app. at 29. See also Loughlin, Part I, supra note 6, at
394-95 (describing the interests of local authorities and banks in the proceedings). The
banks argued that the Council had the authority to enter into the swap agreements under
§ I ll of the Local Government Act.
65. Hammersmith I, [1990] 2 W.L.R. app. at 34-39 (discussing the application of
relevant statutes).
66. Id. at 38 ("We therefore come to the conclusion that none of the transactions are
capable of being lawfully entered into by the council.").
67. See supra note 49.
68. Hammersmith I, [1990] 2 W.L.R. app. at 34-39.
69. Id. In order to be valid, the swap transactions would have to have been incidental
to the borrowing powers of the authority. The court maintained that it was an incident of
borrowing that one pays interest, thus swapping interest rates was only capable of being
"incidental to the incidental." Id. at 37.
70. Hammersmith II, [1990] 2 W.L.R. 1038, 1071 (Eng. C.A.).
71. Id.
The purpose for which a local authority enters into a swap transaction goes to
whether the local authority was empowered to enter into that particular
Id transaction: if it was by way of interest rate risk management, it was so
empowered; if it was not by way of interest rate risk management but was by
way of trading, the authority was not so empowered....
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entered the agreements in the hope of profiting from interest rate
movements, the action would be deemed "trading" and thus illegal.72
If a specific, previous legal debt transaction could be directly linked to
a particular swap transaction, the court would view this as a hedge on the
interest rate of the first transaction and, therefore, a legal transaction."
The Court of Appeal ultimately found that the swap agreements that the
Council had entered into prior to July 1988 were illegal because they
were made in the hope of making a profit and, thus, constituted
"trading." 74 Because the swap transactions instituted after the Council
began its interim strategy were entered into for the purpose of hedging
against rising interest rates in order to protect taxpayers from further
losses, the court held that these swap agreements were valid.'
C. The House of Lords Declares All Swaps Ultra Vires
72. Id. See supra note 69. See also Richard Clutterbuck, Editorial, Local Authorities
and Interest Rate Swaps: When Is Swapping Trading?, 1990 J. Bus. L. 182, 186-87 (May
1990) (scrutinizing the logic behind the differing opinions of the Divisional Court and the
Court of Appeal and determining that they really are trying to reach the same conclusion).
73. Hammersmith 11, [1990] 2 W.L.R. at 1073-74. The court stated, "Counsel were
not able to suggest any proper purpose which could have led the officers to sell... 217
swap options while buying only one." Id. at 1074.
74. Id. In a formal report dated March 15, 1989, the chief executive of the Council
stated, "The original intention was that accumulated surplus from the [capital market] fund
would have been released to support revenue expenditure in future years once the capital
market fund had met all its major liabilities." Id. (alteration in original). The Court of
Appeal refused to view this strategy as a hedge because its intended purpose was to make
profits to be used for later outlays. See id. at 1076.
75. Id. at 1076-77.
The correct principle ... is that, ifa local authority has unwittingly and in good
faith exceeded its powers, but is with good reason uncertain whether or not it
has done so, it has implied power for such period as it reasonably takes to
resolve that uncertainty to take such steps as it reasonably and prudently can to
limit and reduce the loss which its earlier conduct may cause to its ratepayers
or community charge payers.
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On January 24, 1991, the House of Lords adopted the approach of
the Divisional Court by holding that all swap agreements entered into by
local authorities were ultra vires.76 The House of Lords maintained that
there was no express power for the local authorities to enter into the
swap agreements." Thus, in order to support the validity of the swaps,
the banks had to prove that the Council had an implied power under
section 111 of the Local Government Act." However, because the
transactions were neither calculated to facilitate, nor conducive or
incidental to the discharge of the Council's power to borrow under
section I 11, they were illegal."9
The House of Lords next addressed the Court of Appeal's holding
that the agreements entered into during the interim strategy were valid
because their purpose was to facilitate a hedge against further interest
rate risks due to the earlier swaps." The House of Lords concluded
that the interim strategy merely involved fresh swap agreements intended
to alleviate risks from the earlier transactions.8 Because the House of
Lords had already decided that no authority existed for municipalities to
enter into swap transactions, the mere fact that these new swap
agreements related to the interim strategy was not sufficient to make
them legal.82 Section 111 did not provide the Council with power to
enter into the interim swap agreements because the only function these
76. Hammersmith I, [1991] 2 W.L.R. 372, 390-91 (Eng. H.L.).
77. Id. at 382. The banks conceded that local authorities had been given no express
powers to enter into swap agreements. Id.
78. See supra note 49. Under this Act, the question of municipal authority to enter
into a swap agreement rested on whether the swap transaction was planned to "facilitate,"
or was "conducive or incidental to," the discharge of Hammersmith's function of
borrowing. Local Government Finance Act, 1982, ch. 32, § 111 (Eng.). The banks were
not able to show that the swaps qualified under § Ill by any of these means.
Hammersmith 111, [1991] 2 W.L.R., at 382-89 (examining the statute to determine whether
local authorities have borrowing powers).
79. Id. at 388. The House of Lords added, "If swap transactions were lawful a local
authority would be under a duty to consider entering into swap transactions as part of its
duty of debt management." Id.
80. Id. at 390-92. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
81. Id. at 391. Any power to enter into swap transactions during the interim strategy
still had to derive from § Ill of the Local Government Act. Id.
82. Id. The House of Lords explained: "No authority was cited which suggested that
in certain circumstances an ultra vires transaction could be remedied by another ultra vires
transaction.... [S]wap transactions undertaken during the period of the interim strategy
are no different from swap transactions entered into at any earlier period." Id. at 391-92.
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transactions were incidental to was the earlier ultra vires transactions. 3
Thus, the interim strategy agreements were unlawful. 4
The ramifications of the Hammersmith decision are far-reaching. Of
importance to both the Council and the financial institutions that entered
into the swap agreements with the Council, Hammersmith does not have
to make future payments on the £13.0 million to £406.3 million ($21.9
million to $685.4 million) that it would have been required to pay if the
swap agreements had been held valid.85 On the surface, this appears to
be a favorable decision for local authorities because the taxpayers will
not have to bear the liabilities incurred by this calamity. 6 However,
commentators predict that obtaining credit from financial institutions will
become more expensive for local governments as financial institutions try
to recover their losses.87 Furthermore, financial institutions in England
now face an additional element of risk when entering into any swap
agreement with a local authority-whether the courts will find the
83. See supra notes 81-82.
84. Hammersmith III, [1991] 2 W.L.R., at 391-92. The banks put forward one last
argument: Because the Council had been incorporated by Royal Charter, the banks
contended that the Council had the capacity of a natural person to enter into contracts and
thus was not limited by the Local Government Act. Id. at 392. The House of Lords,
however, held that the charter incorporated the London Government Act of 1963 and, thus,
the Council was confined to the powers conferred on it by statute. Id. at 395-96.
Therefore, Hammersmith could not enter into transactions as a corporation either in its own
name or in the name of the borough. Id. at 396. Lord Templeman stated that "[the
banks'] argument strikes me as being not so much arcane as absurd." Id. at 393.
85. Fischer, supra note 43, at 528-29. But see Loughlin, Part II, supra note 12, at 572
(stating that many local authorities were unhappy with the result in the House of Lords,
feeling "honour-bound" to fulfill their swap agreements and advocating legislation that
would validate all existing swap transactions).
86. Loughlin, Part II, supra note 12, at 574. Using a relatively moderate estimate of
the total losses Hammersmith would have incurred had the swap transactions been found
legal, each taxpayer would have had to pay approximately £4,000 ($6,748) to cover the
Council's losses. Id.
87. As one scholar explains:
The relationship between the banks and the local authorities has been soured.
The latter are no longer seen for the present as "blue-chip" clients. As their
credit rating drops so local authorities cannot hope for the same favoumble
treatment as before.... The banks will now feel free to recover monies by
way of restitution.
Richard Clutterbuck, Editorial, Interest Rate Swaps: Gambling Not Insurance, 1991 J. Bus.
L. 105, 108 (Mar. 1991).
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agreement illegal if the deal has an adverse effect on the authority."8
It is conceivable that this could render the credit market for government
entities in the United Kingdom extinct.8 Without the ability to raise
credit and supplement their municipalities' revenue by borrowing needed
funds, local governments could be in serious jeopardy. 9°
If courts in the United States hold similarly, there will be several
consequences. The United States' financial market is Still trying to
regain the investor confidence it lost during the Savings and Loan
fiasco.9' While investors have previously viewed municipal
governments as safe, low-risk investments for their funds,' a holding
88. See id. Clutterbuck continues:
Commercial men... have been shocked to find that normal commercial rules
do not always govern commercial transactions. ... They cannot now sleep
easily if a legal system characterises what would in all other situations be a
commercial transaction as something else because of a lack of capacity on the
part of one of the parties....
Id. at 109.
89. The House of Lords' holding has frightened banks that would normally enter into
deals with local authorities. See Loughlin, Part II, supra note 12, at 573. In an attempt
to regain the banks' trust, the Governor of the Bank of England has strongly supported
legislation to retrospectively validate all municipal government swap contracts, finding it
necessary
both [to restore] the principle of the sanctity of conduct and secondly to enable
a large number of local authorities to complete the deals which they wish to
complete and which they can complete without serious financial embarrassment
and thereby restore their name into the top level in the financial markets.
Id. (alteration in original).
90. Most local governments rely heavily on their ability to raise funds through debt
as a means of facilitating their financial needs. Without the ability to raise funds,
financing local projects, protections, and services could become extremely difficult.
Municipalities would have to rely primarily on current tax revenue for all of their
budgeting. See generally LENNOX L. MOAK & ALBERT M. HILLHOUSE, CONCEPTS AND
PRACTICES IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCING 290-92 (1975) (discussing the uses and
limits of debt policy).
91. See, e.g., Robert G. Day, Note, Administrative Watchdogs or Zealous Advocates?
Implications for Legal Ethics in the Face of Expanded Attorney Liability, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 645, 669 (1993) (explaining the reasons behind the lack of investor confidence in the
late 1980s and subsequent government attempts to get this confidence back by creating
enforcement mechanisms).
92. These safe, high-rated local authorities have always been able to rely on debt
financing because of the near-guarantee that they would have no problem repaying the
debt. However, sometimes these high credit ratings may not be justified. See Randall
Smith & John Connor, Matter of Security: Risky Derivatives Are Huge Source of Funds
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that renders municipalities' derivative agreements ultra vires could have
devastating effects on financial institutions and, thus, the economy.93
If financial institutions were forced to return all profits they have gained
from these agreements, public trust in these institutions would once again
be shaken-a very undesirable result.9"
IV. DERIVATIVE FAILURES HIT THE UNITED STATES:
THE ORANGE COUNTY DEBACLE
On Tuesday, December 6, 1994, Orange County, California became
the largest United States municipality to file for federal bankruptcy
protection.95 Orange County was forced to file for bankruptcy when it
could not meet a $1.2 billion payment on its investment pool96 that had
come due.97  The County's financial demise resulted from large
investments in interest-sensitive reverse repos9" and inverse floaters"
that would benefit the investors only if interest rates dropped or remained
the same.'" When short-term interest rates rose, income from the
For Federal Agencies, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 1995, at Al (discussing the issuing of
structured notes by federal entities).
93. See Richard M. Whiting, A Perspective on Financial Services Restructuring, 37
CATH. U. L. REv. 347, 358 (1988) ("Colloquially speaking, the health of the banking
system and the health of our country's economy go hand-in-hand.").
94. Laura Jereski, Orange County to Seek Summary Ruling Against Merrill, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 1, 1995, at BS; see Joseph M. Heppt, An Alternative to Throwing Stones: A
Proposal for the Reform of Glass-Steagall, 52 BROOK. L. REv. 281, 289 (1986)
("Congress realized that once the public had lost confidence in the banking system, that
system and the economy it serviced were doomed to failure.").
95. Platte, supra note 16, at Al.
96. See supra note 19.
97. Platte, supra note 16, at Al.
98. See supra note 20 (discussing reverse repos).
99. Plaintiff's Complaint 24, County of Orange v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Bankr. C.D.
Cal. (Case No. SA 94-22272-JR) [hereinafter Plaintiff's Complaint]. An inverse floater
is defined as "[a] derivative security, created from bonds issued by corporations and
government agencies, carrying interest rates that vary in the opposite direction of
prevailing short-term rates." WOELFEL, supra note 19, at 136.
100. See Scot J. Paltrow, Investors Weigh Their Options: Legal Action Against
Brokers is Inevitable, Experts Predict, LA. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1994, at DI (discussing actions
taken by Merrill Lynch that contributed to Orange County's losses).
Orange County magnified its exposure to losses with speculative investments made with
the money received from the repurchase agreements. The County would sell a bond issue,
agreeing to repurchase the security at a price tied to a specific index on an agreed upon
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long-term investments of the County was not sufficient to meet the short-
term cash outflows and bankruptcy ensued.)'
Through massive litigation,0 2 the County is attempting to regain
the money lost on the derivative deals by arguing that the investments
were ultra vires because they exceeded a constitutional limitation on
municipal debt. 3 Liability for Orange County's losses will depend on
how the courts answer three important questions: (1) Did the County
have the authority to make the investments?;"° (2) Did the securities
firms adequately disclose the risks associated with the investments?;' °5
and (3) Who was responsible for determining whether the investments
were appropriate for the County?"°
The answer to the question of whether the County ever had the
authority to enter the reverse repo agreements could depend on whether
these transactions are viewed as securities or loans. 07 If the courts
date. After receiving the money for this bond issue, the County invested these funds in
another security tied to an interest rate index for repurchase at a later date. This action
could continue, with the County exposing itself perhaps three times for one investment.
When interest rates rose, the loss to Orange County was magnified by the series of
agreements tied to the first repo. Plaintiffs Complaint, supra note 99, In 24-33.
101. Orange County's Woes Won't Spur Swaps Bill, 5 AM. BANKER WASH. WATCH
1, 5 (Jan. 9, 1995) ("Orange County got into financial trouble because it was highly
leveraged and there was a significant duration gap between its assets and liabilities.")
(quoting acting Treasury Secretary Frank N. Newman, speaking before the Senate Banking
Committee).
Orange County's losses are estimated at $1.7 billion. Debora Vrana, Brokerage May
Be Quizzed Further, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1995, at A16.
102. See supra note 23.
103. Jereski, supra note 94, at B8. See infra note 107 for the relevant provision of
the California Constitution and related statutes.
104. See infra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
105. See infra notes 111-18 and accompanying text.
106. Id.
107. Jereski, supra note 94, at B8. Orange County will argue that the derivative
agreements it entered into were loans (thus subject to the California constitutional limit on
debt) because, although title to the securities involved transferred to Merrill Lynch, the risk
of gain or loss remained with the County. Id. Merrill Lynch, however, will claim that this
transfer of title means the reverse repos are securities, not debt, and thus not subject to the
constitutional ceiling on debt. Id. Courts have split over whether repurchase agreements
are securities or loans. Id. For this reason, the decision of the California courts on this
issue alone could determine the outcome of the case. Id.
In Plaintiffs Complaint, Orange County fully sets forth its claim that the derivative
deals with Merrill Lynch should be held ultra vires based on a violation of article XVI,
§ 18 of the California Constitution. Plaintiff's Complaint, supra note 99, M 15-21, 34-50.
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find that these agreements were in fact loans, Orange County would have
violated the State's constitutional debt limitation. °8 Thus, courts could
hold the reverse repos ultra vires.09 A holding of this nature could
have a devastating effect on financial institutions that deal with
municipal governments. Fearing that municipalities could walk away
from losing agreements, securities firms would be reluctant to provide
much-needed financing for local governments."0
If the courts find that Orange County had the authority to enter into
the derivative agreements as an investment in securities, the County will
attempt to assert that it should not be held liable for the losses because
Merrill Lynch". failed to adequately disclose the risky nature of the
derivatives to the municipality."' The County will further assert that
Article XVI, § 18 of the California Constitution provides that no county "shall incur any
indebtedness or liability in any manner or for any purpose exceeding in any year the
income and revenue provided for such year, without the assent of two-thirds of the
qualified voters thereof." CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. XVI, § 18 (1974).
Further, California Government Code § 25256 states that "[a]ny debts or liabilities
which exceed in any fiscal year the income and revenue provided for that year" are void.
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 25256 (West 1988).
Additionally, the California Government Code limits every county official and person
from the "incurring or paying of obligations to the amounts of the appropriations allowed
by the budget." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 29120 (West 1988).
Finally, California Government Code §§ 53601 and 53635, infra note 134, restrict
investments in repurchase agreements "to those where the proceeds are utilized 'solely to
supplement the income' which would normally be received from the securities, and further
limit such investments to those made with the prior approval of the legislative body of the
applicable local agency." Plaintiff's Complaint, supra note 99, 21.
108. See supra note 107.
109. Jereski, supra note 94, at B8.
I10. Id.
111. Merrill Lynch has been the main investment company named in every suit
Orange County has filed. This is due to the fact that "Merrill ... played by far the
biggest role in selling risky derivatives to the county's ill-starred investment fund ...
Merrill ... also helped the county borrow huge sums to buy still more of the securities
that plummeted in value as interest rates rose." Paltrow, supra note 100, at DI. Merrill
reportedly earned $80 million for services provided to Orange County. Id. Merrill and
Orange County have had a close relationship for over twenty years. See Holding, supra
note 20, at AS.
In a memo released by Merrill, the firm admitted that it was one of 11 investment firms
that paid the City of San Jose, California a total of $12.1 million to settle a suit in which
the firm was accused of advising the city to invest in speculative transactions while
lending San Jose the money to enter these transactions. Id. These agreements also
involved reverse repos and resulted in a $73 million loss to San Jose. Id.
112. Id. (discussing inadequate disclosure in similar cases).
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it was the responsibility of the investment firm to determine whether the
investment strategy of Orange County was appropriate or not for a local
government.1
13
On January 9, 1995, the first class-action complaint against Merrill
Lynch was filed in federal court. The complaint identified six areas in
which the investment firm failed to act in a proper and legal manner."4
Orange County attorneys emphasized the municipality's lack of
sophistication and inability to understand the complexities of the
transactions it entered." 5 The County maintains that Merrill Lynch
failed in its duty to appraise the County of the risks associated with its
investment decisions."' Merrill Lynch, however, insists it warned
113. Id. (listing questions to be resolved by suit).
114. First Lawsuit Filed, supra note 23. The Schools Excess Liability Fund, one of
the Orange County pool participants, filed suit against Merrill Lynch and others. The
complaint alleges that:
(1) Defendants failed to disclose to the Pool Participants the true nature of the
risks; (2) Defendant failed to properly advise Pool Participants in 1994 that their
investment funds were so highly leveraged that the already substantial risks of
investing in derivatives were dramatically increased; (3) Defendants knew, as
early as May 1994, of the extreme volatility of the derivative securities; (4)
Defendants knew, as early as August 1993, the Orange County Treasurer's
Office was operating without adequate internal controls, which enabled Merrill
Lynch effectively to direct and control the investment policy of the pool; (5)
Merrill Lynch and Orange County engaged in a number of unusual transactions
which were apparently designed to assist Merrill Lynch to meet certain financial
statement ratios required by the Securities and Exchange Commission; and (6)
even while Merrill Lynch designed this high risk investment strategy, it
protected itself against loss and reaped in excess of $80 million in fees.
Id.
115. See generally Holding, supra note 20, at Al (noting that large corporations such
as Proctor & Gamble and Gibson Greetings have claimed a lack of sophistication in suits
against Bankers Trust for losses in derivatives agreements); Platte, supra note 16, at Al
(quoting local official's bitterness over the ability of "hotshot" investment bankers to pitch
derivatives and suck unsophisticated investors into entering transactions).
116. Attorney Jan Adler, plaintiff's counsel in securities lawsuits, states that brokers
have "a very strict legal duty" to an investor who is "unknowing" and dependant on the
investment banker for advice. Holding, supra note 20, at A8.
See also Mary S. Ludwig, What Went Sour in Bob Citron's Orange County Portfolio,
CoRP. CAsHFILow, Feb. 1995, at 37, 38 ("Some have likened Merrill's role in this mess
to that of a bartender serving a drunk another drink.").
Although various comments demonstrate Citron's confidence in his ability to enter the
derivative agreements, see infra note 117, an excerpt of a letter from Citron to Merrill
Lynch Director Michael Starenson indicates Citron's reliance on the investment firm: "In
fact, Mike, it was only after extensive consultation with highly placed Merrill Lynch
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Orange County on several occasions of the inherent risks in its
investment decisions, but the County, specifically County Treasurer
Robert Citron, refused to take any corrective action' 1 7 The investment
officials by conference call, in person, and in writing well over a year ago that we felt
secure in investing an even larger percentage of our portfolio in derivative securities."
Letter from Robert L. Citron, County Treasurer, to Michael G. Stamenson, Municipality
Unit Director, Merrill Lynch (Apr. 26, 1993) available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Extra
File [hereinafter Letter from Citron to Stamenson of 4/26/93].
117. Merrill Lynch released documents intended to prove that Orange County was
warned at least six times during 1992 and 1993 that its investment strategy was risky.
Brad Altman, Merrill Lynch Warned Orange County of Investment Strategy Risk, Firm
Says, BOND BUYEP, Jan. 12, 1995, at 3. The investment firm further states that in March
1993, Merrill Lynch salesman Michael G. Stamenson offered to repurchase the derivatives
he sold the County, cautioning that the securities might be highly risky. Id. Additionally,
at further meetings with Orange County officials, Merrill Lynch again stressed the negative
consequences that could befall the municipality if interest rates were to rise. Altman,
supra, at 3.
Merrill Lynch released its correspondence with Citron made during 1992 and 1993.
These letters show Merrill's efforts to warn Citron of the riskiness of his investment
strategy and shield the company from liability.
[T]he Orange County portfolio has a modified duration of approximately seven
years. The duration indicates substantially more price volatility than would be
expected from a portfolio with such short average maturity...
... [Although Orange County has enhanced the yield and decreased its
maximum average maturity on its fund with reverse repos and inverse floaters,]
it has also made maturity a less reliable indicator of the price sensitivity of the
portfolios. We suggest that Orange County constantly review the volatility in
the existing portfolio and review incorporating some measure of duration as an
additional portfolio guideline.
Letter from Michael G. Stamenson, Municipality Unit Director, Merrill Lynch, to Robert
L. Citron, County Treasurer (Oct. 14, 1992) available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Extra
File.
In a subsequent letter to Citron, Stamenson advised:
If you are interested in selling any or all of your portfolio we would be pleased
to update [our] bids, subject to changed conditions in the marketplace.
As we have discussed in the past, the prices of these securities can fluctuate.
I would like to reiterate that the market for these notes will be affected by a
number of factors independent of the credit worthiness of the issues and the
value of the applicable currency or interest rate index. Secondary market bids
may be affected by the volatility of the applicable currency or interest rate
index, the time remaining to maturity of each note, the amount outstanding of
such notes and general interest rate movements.
Letter from Michael G. Stamenson, Municipality Unit Director, Merrill Lynch, to Robert
L. Citron, County Treasurer (Mar. 31, 1993) available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Extra
File.
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firm also asserts that Orange County officials indeed possessed the
To this letter, Citron replied:
Thank you for offering to make a secondary market for repurchase of derivative
securities that we have previously purchased from you. At this point in time,
and even projecting into the far future, we do not believe that we would be
interested in selling these derivative securities....
... We have always been aware of the vicissitudenary [sic] nature of the
derivative securities that we have mainly bought from Merrill Lynch and others.
Although there may be an alleged interest rate risk in this type of securities, we
believe because of future low interest rates that the securities that we now own
may be even more valuable than they are today.
Letter from Citron to Stamenson 4/26193, supra note 116.
Stamenson repeated his warning:
While we certainly endeavor to maintain secondary markets in securities we
sell, we are not allowed to guarantee the existence of any secondary market and
would not want any investor to be under the impression that we would ....
In addition, I appreciate that you are aware of the risks involved in
purchasing derivative securities and your expectation of low or lower interest
rates in the future. I am also aware of our discussions with economists and
market strategists at Merrill Lynch, but would not and could not represent that
Orange County should base its' [sic] portfolio strategy exclusively on Merrill
interest rate projections. The reason for our March bid letter was to allow
Orange County the opportunity to lower its' [sic] risk profile in derivative
securities at a profit. While no one knows for certain the direction of interest
rates, we thought it appropriate to advise Orange County of the profitable
market opportunity at this time. While the decision is yours to make, it was our
hope to assist you in bringing the O.C. portfolio in line with a risk profile that
is less leveraged and better positioned to perform in the event of unanticipated
movements in interest rates.
Letter from Michael G. Stamenson, Municipality Unit Director, Merrill Lynch, to Robert
L. Citron, County Treasurer (June 16, 1993) available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Extra
File.
Merrill Lynch also sought to reduce its liability in an interoffice memorandum dated
January 10, 1995. This memorandum detailed the steps Merrill took to warn and advise
Orange County of the riskiness of the derivative security agreements the County had
entered into. Interoffice Memorandum from Daniel P. Tully, Merrill Lynch Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer to Merrill Lynch Employees (Jan. 10, 1995) available in LEXIS,
Genfed Library, Extra File.
See also Agent Orange, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 15, 1995, at 19 ("It gradually emerged
that [Citron] had long ago adopted a high-risk, high-reward investment strategy.... At
the height of his success Mr. Citron was confident enough to ridicule the acumen of
investment bankers at Goldman Sachs who tried to persuade him that he was riding for afall.").
While Citron appeared amazingly confident in his ability to predict trends in interest rate
movements when dealing with the taxpayers' funds, his personal investment strategy
earned him the nickname "the cowardly lion" because he invested primarily in savings
accounts and tax-free funds. Ludwig, supra note 116, at 38.
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requisite sophistication and knowledge to enter into derivative
transactions as they saw fit; they just made poor financial decisions."'
As the Orange County cases make their way through the court
system, taxpayers, municipal officers, and financial investors remain
fearful of the results an adverse decision would have on their future
prosperity."9 If the courts hold the local government liable for its
money-losing investment decisions, taxpayers will have no recourse for
their officials' mistakes and will be forced to bear the burden of this
speculative investment strategy."' Given the potential magnitude of
derivative losses'.' and the predictions that reported losses have just
scraped the surface of forthcoming losses," derivative loss could be
118. Acting Treasury Secretary FrankN. Newman downplayed the role derivatives had
in the Orange County bankruptcy. Instead, Newman believes that the loss was the result
of highly leveraged loans that left the county susceptible to short-term interest rate risk.
He suggested that this act of borrowing short to invest long, not investments in derivatives,
caused the bankruptcy. Derivative Financial Instruments Relating to Banks and Financial
Institutions: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
104th Cong., Ist Sess. 15 (1995) (testimony of Frank N. Newman, Acting Treasury
Secretary) [hereinafter Newman testimony].
119. See infra notes 120-27 and accompanying text.
120. With a population of 2.6 million and losses now estimated at $1.7 billion, see
supra note 101, each person in Orange County would have more than a $650 share in the
loss. Anne Willette, In Long Run, Taxes Could Rise to Offset Damage, USA TODAY, Dec.
8, 1994, at 3B. While police and fire protection will continue and employees will get
paid, residents of Orange County may well end up paying higher taxes so that the County
can continue to meet its obligations. Id.
On June 27, 1995, however, Orange County voters rejected a half-penny sales-tax
increase, the proceeds of which were to be used to help reduce the County's debt to its
bondholders. The financial world was stunned by the taxpayers' refusal to back the credit
of the County-a municipality's ability and willingness to raise tax revenues to pay its
debts is the foundation upon which credit ratings rest. Daniel Heimowitz, executive vice-
president of Moody's Investors Service, summed up this shock: "Basically, what Orange
County is saying [to bondholders] is, 'We took your money, lost your money and now we
don't owe you money.' We think this is unprecedented...." Fred Vogelstein, Voter
Revolt Shakes Faith In Muni Sector, WALL ST. J., June 29, 1995, at Cl.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 12, 19 & 62-63.
122. Because derivatives became popular as a financing device for municipal
governments, see supra note 34, and interest rates continued to rise, it can only be
expected that Orange County will not be the last municipality to lose large sums in this
market. In fact, Congress' General Accounting Office reports that dozens of state and
local pension plans are losing hundreds of millions of dollars in the derivative market-the
burden of which is to be borne by the taxpayers. Protect the Public from Speculation in
Derivatives, USA TODAY, Dec. 7, 1994, at 10A.
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to the taxpayer of the 1990s what the Savings and Loan bail-out was to
the taxpayer of the 19 8 0 s."i
Alternatively, the courts could maintain that the municipality never
had the authority to enter into the derivative transactions. Under this
scenario the financial institutions could be forced to reimburse the pool
participants for their losses in the speculative investment strategy. 24
A decision of this kind would severely cripple the investment banking
firms involved because of the massive drain on their assets."z Further,
the decision would seriously limit the future borrowing ability of local
governments because investment banking firms would either be unwilling
to deal with them or charge exorbitant fees to cover their exposure to
potential losses on the loans. 126  The possible ramifications to both
123. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text (discussing the similarities between
the Savings and Loan crisis and the problems that a similar disaster in the derivatives
market could cause).
124. If the courts hold the derivative agreements ultra vires, the deals would have been
beyond the powers conferred upon the municipality by law and, thus, the transactions
would be void. Were this to occur, Orange County could potentially get back all of the
money it lost on the deals and the financial institutions would have to absorb all of the
losses. See generally Paltrow, supra note 100, at D I (stating experts believe the brokerage
firms face a significant risk of being forced to reimburse the County for its loss).
125. With their generally low capital reserves, financial institutions lack sufficient
funds to cover a rapid draining of assets from their balance sheets. See Harris Weinstein,
Moral Hazard Deposit Insurance and Banking Regulation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1099,
1101 (1992) ("The average equity capital-to-asset ratio for all nonfinancial firms in 1986
was 36%. By contrast, the average bank capital-to-asset ratio is generally 6%. Several
of the largest thrifts that eventually failed operated with less than 2% capital.") (footnotes
omitted).
126. One scholar has noted:
Where things are never going to be the same is in the municipal bond market.
When the financial ground shifted in the once-AA-rated county, the temblors
were felt--and the aftershocks continue to rumble-clear across the country to
Wall Street. And there, the fallout from the disaster will be felt for years-in
the status of investor confidence, in the increase in regulatory oversight, and in
the ways credit analysts and bond insurers cast their scrutinous eyes on issuers'
financial situations.
Penelope Lemov, After The Fiscal Quake, GOVERNING, Feb. 1995, at 34.
A commentor further explains:
Already, players are talking about the Orange County fiasco possibly driving
yields on other municipal bonds higher-making it more expensive for other
cities to borrow, and perhaps forcing more to pay for insurance ....
Heather Rush, president of the Public Securities Association, the industry
trade group, said, "Uncertainty about the county's willingness to pay is already
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parties in the Orange County disaster of an unfavorable court decision
lead many experts to conclude that they will settle rather than leave their
fate in the hands of the courts.'27
V. MUNICIPAL DERIVATIVE REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES
As more local governments experience trouble in the derivative
market,2 8 the cry for reform grows louder. 9  Those supporting
reform believe that it is necessary primarily because understanding and
avoiding the risks associated with the use of derivatives requires a high
degree of sophistication. 3 °  Before exploring legislative reform,
however, it is important to understand how municipal governments obtain
the power to enter into derivative agreements.''
raising the cost of general obligation debt across the country. If elected officials
and taxpayers in one of the nation's wealthiest counties can avoid the hard
choices ... , how can we expect less well-off communities to uphold their
commitments when the going gets rough?"
Vogelstein, supra note 120, at Cl, C20.
127. Following the Hammersmith decision, several test cases were selected by the
High Court which addressed major points of law left unanswered by the House of Lords'
decision in Hammersmith. All of these cases were settled before going to trial. John
Mason, Final Swaps Test Case Settled, FIN. TIMES, May 16, 1992, at 4.
This same scenario could occur in the Orange County cases if the parties are unsure of
what the courts will hold and do not want to risk an all-or-nothing decision. Further, the
rejection of the tax increase makes the likelihood of settlement much more probable.
Michael Siconolfi, Rejection of Orange County Tax Boost May Help Merrill Lynch in
Negotiations, WALL ST. J., June 29, 1995, at A5 (noting that the County will be more
likely to settle for a smaller amount as a result of the tax-hike rejection).
128. See supra note 45.
129. See infra notes 142-56 and accompanying text (detailing Congressional
movements for reform in the derivative market).
130. In early 1994, the Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) and the
Municipal Bond Investors Assurance Corporation jointly surveyed over 1,600 government
finance professionals. The results demonstrate that government officials lack knowledge
of the derivatives market. For example: (1) only 6% had actually used a derivative
product in debt financing; (2) only 4% thought of themselves as being "very
knowledgeable about derivative products" and another 20% felt they only understood the
basics of a derivative transaction; (3) 76% felt they had only some or no knowledge of
derivative products; and (4) 36% perceived derivative products to be too risky. Financial
Derivatives: Governments as End Users, GOV'T FiN. REv., Aug. 1994, at 13, 15
[hereinafter Financial Derivatives].
131. For a detailed discussion of state and local governments' authority to enter into
swaps, see Jeanette Redmond, Note, State and Local Governmental Entities: In Search of
... Statutory Authority to Enter into Interest Rate Swap Agreements, 63 FoRDHAM L.
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Municipal governments' authority to enter into derivative
agreements derives from state statutes. 132 The statutes either grant this
authority explicitly with well-defined rules, 3 3 or implicitly through the
investing powers granted to the municipalities. 34  However, there is a
REv. 2177 (1995).
132. See id. at 2180 (discussing the growth of express statutory authority).
133. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 41-1-42 (Supp. 1994):
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, governmental entities shall be
authorized to enter into swap agreements as follows:
(1) Subject only to subdivision (2) of this section, any governmental entity
may enter into one or more swap agreements which the governmental entity
determines to be necessary or desirable in connection with, or incidental to,
the conduct of its proper activities, including in connection with its
acquisition or carrying of investments or the issuance, acquisition, carrying,
or securing of its authorized debt instruments, bonds, notes, agreements, or
indebtedness....
(2) No governmental entity shall enter into any swap agreement unless all of
the following occur-
a. The governmental entity's governing body first finds and determines,
and certifies to the counterparty, that the swap agreement is entered into
for the purpose of hedging against an interest rate, investment, payment,
or other similar risk that arises in connection with or incidental to the
proper activities of the governmental entity.
b. The swap agreement requires the counterparty to pledge collateral to the
governmental entity in the approximate amount estimated at least quarterly,
that would be payable by the counterparty to the governmental entity if the
counterparty defaulted under the swap agreement on such estimation date.
Id.
134. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53601 (West Supp. 1995):
The legislative body of a local agency having money in a sinking fund of, or
surplus money in, its treasury not required for the immediate necessities of the
local agency may invest such portion of the money as it deems wise or
expedient in:
(i) Investments in repurchase agreements or reverse repurchase agreements
of any securities authorized by this section.
Id. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53635 (West Supp. 1995):
As far as possible, all money belonging to, or in the custody of, a local
agency, including money paid to the treasurer or other official to pay the
principal, interest, or penalties of bonds, shall be deposited for safekeeping in
state or national banks, or state or federal savings and loan associations in the
state selected by the treasurer or other official having the legal custody of the
money, or may be invested in the following unless otherwise directed by the
legislative body pursuant to Section 53601:
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small, yet growing number of states that forbid local governments from
entering into derivative transactions. 3
5
While states have begun to constrict local governments' ability to
enter into these transactions, federal agencies continue to assert that no
legislation is needed to curtail activity in this exploding market. Time
and again, the various federal regulatory agencies have given the
derivative market a clean bill of health. 36  In a hearing before the
Senate Banking Committee on January 5, 1995, acting Treasury Secretary
Frank Newman, Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan,
Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Arthur Levitt, and
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Chairman Mary Schapiro, four
of the United States' most influential financial leaders, asserted that the
derivative market is sound and that no new legislation is needed to
regulate this financial instrument. 37
i) Investments in repurchase agreements or reverse repurchase agreements of
any securities authorized by this section.
Id.
135. Municipalities in the State of New York are only allowed to invest in items which
are deemed "eligible securities". Effective June 30, 1995, "eligible securities" included
only:
(i) Obligations issued by the United States of America, an agency thereof or
a United States government sponsored corporation or obligations fully insured
or guaranteed as to the payment of principal and interest by the United States
of America, an agency thereof or a United States government sponsored
corporation.
(ii) Obligations issued or fully guaranteed by the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, the Inter-American Development Bank, the
Asian Development Bank, and the African Development Bank.
(iii) Obligations partially insured or guaranteed by any agency of the United
States of America, at a proportion of the market value of the obligation that
represents the amount of the insurance or guaranty.
(iv) Obligations issued or fully insured or guaranteed by this state, obligations
issued by a municipal corporation, school district or district corporation of this
state or obligations of any public benefit corporation which under a specific
state statute may be accepted as security for deposit of public moneys.
N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 1..f (McKinney Supp. 1995).
Thus, municipal governments do not have the authority to enter into derivative
agreements.
136. See, e.g., Bloomberg Reports, Clean Bill of Health for US Derivatives, S. CHINA
MORNING PosT, Nov. 4, 1993, at Business 4 (noting that the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission found no need for changes in derivatives regulation).
137. Regulators Tell Senate Panel No Derivatives Legislation Needed Now, 64
BANKING REP. (BNA) No. 2, at 67 (Jan. 9, 1995) [hereinafter Regulators Tell.. .]. The
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While agreeing that regulators need to keep a watchful eye on the
derivative market, 38 the financial leaders professed their belief that the
Orange County calamity was the result of an improper investment
strategy rather than the use of derivatives.'39 Furthermore, Levitt
contended that federal agencies generally do not have the authority to
regulate municipal governments' investment decisions. 140  Chairman
Greenspan added that legislation was not the answer due to the rapidly
changing nature of the derivative market.'4'
While these four financial leaders apparently want to retain their
own power and preserve the states' power to decide the future of the
derivative market, many senators and representatives are tiring of
burdensome taxpayer losses and contend that Congress must restrict
four members who testified are all members of the President's Working Group on
Financial Matters. This group was initially formed in the wake of the Black Monday stock
market crash of October 19, 1987. In 1994, Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen revived the
group. Id.
138. See, e.g., Derivative Financial Instruments Relating to Banks and Financial
Institutions: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1995) (statement of Arthur Levitt, Securities and Exchange
Commission Chairman) [hereinafter Levitt statement] ("As I have said on prior occasions,
derivatives are not inherently bad or good-they are a bit like electricity: Dangerous if
mishandled; but bearing the potential to do tremendous good. Like any new innovation,
the use of derivatives needs to be watched closely by end-users and by regulatory
agencies.").
139. See Levitt statement, supra note 138, at 72 ("One can not understate the
seriousness of the effects of the Orange County bankruptcy. It would be a grave error,
however, to demonize derivatives and blame them for the loss."); Derivative Financial
Instruments Relating to Banks and Financial Institutions: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1995)
(statement of Alan Greenspan, Federal Reserve Board Chairman) [hereinafter Greenspan
statement] ("[I]t is by no means clear that these losses have been attributable solely, or in
some cases, even primarily, to ... derivatives. ... [It] would be a serious mistake to
respond to these developments by singling out derivative instruments for special regulatory
treatment.'). Id.
140. Levitt statement, supra note 138, at 61 ("The Commission generally does not
have, nor does it seek, the ability to regulate investment decisions by municipalities....
In the case of State and local public instrumentalities, investment decisions should be made
with the guidance and oversight of State and local governments.").
141. See Frank Shafroth, A Sobering Event: County's Bankruptcy Filing Rattles Bond
Market, NATION'S CrTES WICLY., Dec. 12, 1994, at 1 ("The trouble with legislation is that
it is very likely in this type of market to become rapidly obsolete, and could very readily
become counter-productive to the required flexibility that we need to address the types of
problems that we are addressing.") (quoting Alan Greenspan).
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municipalities' ability to enter these agreements. 142 The biggest push
for legislative reform began in 1993, when Representative Jim Leach, the
current Chairman of the House Banking Committee, issued a 900-page
report on derivatives 143 and proposed massive legislation that would
attempt to ensure the safety of derivative investments. 44  As the
dangers inherent in the derivative market become more readily apparent,
members of Congress are sensing the inadequate response of the
regulatory agencies 145  and are resolving to combat the problem
themselves. 146 The remedies that legislators have proposed range from
greater disclosure by financial institutions of the risks involved in
142. For example, U.S. Representative Jim Leach used the following analogy in a
speech at the GAO Conference on Banking to explain why he thought federal legislation
prohibiting improper derivatives use would be better than comparable state legislation:
Just as in banking and S&L regulation the public must be wary of ever allowing
the fox to guard the chicken coop, so in the derivatives arena it must insist that
foxes be guarded by more than roosters. Crowing in the morning must be
followed by a careful tending to eggs in the afternoon.
Jim Leach, GAO Conference on Banking-Orange County Bankruptcy, Congressional
Press Releases, Dec. 8, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
143. Robert A. Rosenblatt, Orange County in Bankruptcy, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 8, 1994,
at A26.
144. Leach, supra note 142 (describing his bill, H.R. 3748).
145. At the January 5, 1995 Senate Hearing on derivatives, Senator Paul Sarbanes told
the federal regulatory agency Chairpersons that they were "'so busy trying to make the
point' that broad derivatives legislation is not needed at this time that they 'minimized the
problems of derivatives."' Regulators Tell. . ., supra note 137, at 67. See also Leach,
supra note 142.
146. Headlines May Result in Legislative Controls, BANKING ATT'Y, Dec. 19, 1994,
at 1, 4 (predicting that the Orange County crisis would spur legislative action). But see
Regulators Tell.... supra note 137, at 67. ("'We can hold all the hearings we want, but
we will never eliminate risk in a capitalistic society .. ") (quoting Senator Phil Gramm).
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derivative agreements 47 to a complete prohibition on entering
derivative transactions by municipal governments.
In June 1992, the House of Representatives' Subcommittee on
Telecommunications and Finance of the Committee on Energy and
Commerce began investigating the use of derivatives. 4s  After
surveying over 4,600 state and local government entities that are
members of the Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA), the
General Accounting Office issued a 195-page report disclosing the
survey's findings.' 49 Based in part on the findings of this report, the
GFOA issued a policy statement on the regulation of derivatives. 5
The statement suggests four courses of action to be taken by the federal
government: (1) close regulatory gaps for dealers of derivative
products;' 51 (2) clarify current suitability rules and promulgate new
rules; 52 (3) accelerate the Financial Accounting Standards Board's
standard-setting process for accounting and disclosure of derivative
147. Keith Bradsher, As Washington's Old Order Gives Way, No Clear Signs from the
New, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1994, at D7.
The most recent proposal in the House of Representatives, introduced by Rep.
Christopher Cox (R-Cal.), seeks to decrease local governments' and private investors'
abilities to recover their losses due to securities fraud. Congress is Wrong to Limit
Investor Suits, SEATTLE TIMEs, May 29, 1995, at B4 [hereinafter Congress is Wrong]. The
bill will make it more difficult for investors to recover from accountants, lawyers,
stockbrokers, insurance agents and financial advisors who have defrauded the investors.
Jerry Knight, Securities Bill Called Too Lenient, WASH. POST, May 25, 1995, at B10.
Critics claim that passage of this bill would have the effect of discouraging taxpayer suits
in situations such as Orange County and the Savings and Loan scandal. Id. at B10, B13.
For a discussion of an earlier proposal with similar provisions, see Lynn S. Hume, Rep.
Markey's Bill Sounds Battle Cry Over Reform of Securities Litigation, BOND BUYER, Jan.
19, 1995, at 25.
148. Financial Derivatives, supra note 130, at 14.
149. 1d. The final result was the GAO REPORt, supra note 3.
150. Gov't Fin. Ass 'n Policy, supra note 33, at 16.
151. The GFOA notes that currently, "[w]hile financial institutions are subject to
periodic regulatory examinations regarding their use of derivatives, there are no federal
regulations regarding derivative activities by securities and insurance firm affiliates, and
there is little or no state oversight of derivatives activities of insurance company affiliates."
Id.
152. The GFOA notes that, "State and local governments must be assured that the
product recommended for their use is appropriate and that the broker or dealer has
disclosed his or her own position with regard to the derivatives contract." Id.
See generally Peter M. Geckeler, Note, Municipal Derivatives Use and the Suitability
Doctrine, 49 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 285 (1996) (providing a comprehensive
look at the application of suitability standards to the sale of derivatives to municipalities).
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activities by brokers and dealers;5 3 and (4) examine and establish
reasonable capital requirements for brokers and dealers.'5 4 The GFOA
contends that legislation or regulation covering these matters will
alleviate end-user 5' losses on derivatives.
56
VI. PROPOSAL
Municipal-bond derivative transactions are a complicated area of
local financing, requiring investor sophistication and lots of luck. As
more and more municipalities ask their taxpayers and the courts to cover
million dollar losses from improper speculation on interest rates, the push
for reform of the derivative market grows stronger. Opinions on how to
reform the market range from relying on a laissezfaire attitude, allowing
municipal governments to squander taxpayer money through faulty
investments,"5 7 to an approach that declares unlawful all prior, present,
and future derivative deals.158
153. This suggestion responds to the delay in getting accurate information: "Investors,
creditors, regulators and other users of financial reports must be able to rely on consistent
reporting of material information. Lack of accounting rules can result in inconsistent and
misleading reporting on derivative products." Gov't Fin. Ass'n Policy, supra note 33, at
16.
This acceleration could be accomplished more easily by requiring municipalities to
"mark" their investments to the market. "Mark-to-markee is "[t]he adjustment of a
position to its current market value." SOLvING THE MYSTERY, supra note 33, at 95. This
would ensure that the derivatives' present value is more accurately portrayed to investors.
154. As the policy explains, "[c]apital requirements are imposed to provide protection
from unexpected losses, reduce the likelihood of failure of an institution or firm, and
protect clients and creditors. Currently, only banks have capital requirements. There are
no capital requirements for securities firms or insurance companies [sic] affiliate derivative
dealers." Gov't Fin. Ass'n Policy, supra note 33, at 16.
155. See supra note 33.
156. Financial Derivatives, supra note 130, at 16.
157. See, e.g., Patrick Cox, Don'tBan Derivatives, USA TODAY, Dec. 7, 1994, at IOA
(proposing that banning derivatives use is counterproductive). See also Regulators Tell
.supra note 137, at 67 (quoting Senator Gramm's contention that the risk of failure
must always be present if we are to live in a capitalist society).
158. See, e.g., Walker F. Todd, Prescribing for Orange County Ills, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Jan. 8, 1995, at F01. The author states "[derivatives] normally belong nowhere near
fiduciaries entrusted with public funds. Someone is almost certainly going to get burned
when so volatile a mixture gets combined with the securities firms' political contributions,
the gullibility of public treasurers and the eagerness of elected county and state officials
to maximize nontax revenues." Id.
Todd further argues that it is quite alright for an investment firm using private capital
to invest in derivatives or reverse repos-whether to reduce investment risk or to speculate
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While both alternatives have negative aspects, 5 9 Congress and the
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) could fashion their own way to
eliminate local government speculation in the derivative market. This
can be done without stripping away a municipality's ability to safely and
prudently use derivatives as a hedging mechanism against interest rate
risk. To do this, Congress would first have to give the SEC jurisdiction
over state and local government investment policies. This could be done
through the Interstate Commerce Clause, the Securities Act of 1933, or
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.' 60
Despite the argument made by some critics that the GFOA policy
statement represents the best alternative, 61 Congress should realize that
this policy is geared towards the regulation of derivative dealers, brokers,
and investment companies-not the end-user municipal governments.
While this type of regulation would necessarily have a positive regulatory
effect on end-users, legislation directly limiting the powers of local
governments to enter speculative derivative transactions would be a more
logical policy choice. It would also ensure that catastrophes like Orange
County do not occur again, while maintaining municipal authority to
reduce interest rate risk through the use of derivatives.
To ensure security in the derivative market, Congress and the SEC
should pass a four-part law that would effectively guarantee that
municipal governments could not gamble with taxpayer money by
speculating on interest rate movement. First, local authorities should be
forced to match a derivative transaction with a specific debt transaction
and be able to show how the derivative deal will act as a hedge against
the interest rate exposure of the original transaction. This requirement
increases the likelihood that derivative agreements will be entered into
on interest rates-but that it is a completely different story when a public official is
charged with managing public funds. Id.
159. For an example of how the "hands-off' approach to municipal derivatives can
have negative aspects, one need only look to the Orange County case. See supra part IV.
To understand why an absolute ban on municipalities engaging in the derivative market
could cripple the municipal bond market, see Fischer, supra note 43, at 520-24 (providing
an excellent discussion of the interest rate hedging that swaps can accomplish).
160. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1988); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1988). The sheer magnitude of present bond deals
virtually assures that the Interstate Commerce Clause can be invoked, because bondholders
and investors throughout the country will be involved in the transactions.
161. See supra notes 151-57 and accompanying text.
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with the original transactions in mind, and decreases the likelihood of
municipalities pursuing a gamble to increase rates of return.
Second, any derivative deal that forces the total notional amount of
outstanding derivatives above the municipality's outstanding debt should
be made per se illegal and void from its inception. A municipality can
gain absolutely no hedging advantage once the notional amount equals
the outstanding debt. 62 Thus, this level should be set as the cap for
derivative deals. Coupled with the first step of this proposal, all
derivative transactions would then be tied to a specific debt and the
municipal authority would not be able to over-invest in the derivative
market, ensuring the non-speculative nature of the investments.
Third, municipal officers who wish to engage in derivative
transactions should first have to complete a certified educational program
on municipal derivatives and pass a test demonstrating sophistication in
this market. Congress and the SEC should specify an agency or the
GFOA to certify such educational programs. In addition, the designated
agency should administer a uniform test covering the broad range of
derivative deals that a municipality might enter. Ensuring that the
municipal officers are knowledgeable in derivative transactions will make
them much less susceptible to the temptation to invest in speculative
derivatives pushed by aggressive financial institutions.
Fourth, the average maturity on a municipal government's
outstanding derivative transactions should be limited to no more than 180
days. Municipalities become more susceptible to losses in the derivative
market from interest rate fluctuations when their derivative deals do not
mature for a long period of time. 63 Shortening the average maturity
period for a local authority's derivatives to 180 days would significantly
reduce the risk of massive losses-if a derivative deal is losing money
for the municipality, the short-term nature of the deal will minimize loss
as the transaction quickly closes.
Implementing these four steps at the federal level would be the most
effective way to curb municipalities' wild speculation on interest rate
162. With proper hedging techniques, all interest rate risk from outstanding debt can
be hedged when the notional amount equals the outstanding debt. See Fischer, supra note
43, at 520-21.
163. Local Govt's Must Learn to Manage Porfolios-Hayes, REUTERS, Dec. 19, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Reufin File (noting that the average maturity of Orange
County's portfolio before the municipality declared bankruptcy was four years, but that
plans were underway to reduce the average maturity to 180 days or less).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol49/iss1/12
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movements in the hope of gaining a quick profit. It would, however,
still allow municipal governments the flexibility they need to hedge
against these same fluctuations.
VII. CONCLUSION
As the municipal bond market has grown, government officials have
looked for ways to decrease their debt payments. This desire has led to
widespread speculation in the municipal-bond derivative market. As
illustrated by the Orange County disaster, taxpayers are left with nothing
but unanswered questions when their local governments squander billions
of dollars. Congress should not sit idly by and watch the derivative
market turn into another Savings and Loan fiasco. Congress must
impose mandatory guidelines that forbid municipalities from gambling
on the direction interest rates will move while still allowing the local
governments to use derivatives safely as a hedge against future interest
rate fluctuation.
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